A billion Chinese can't be wrong, but even if they are... they aren't

One billion pennies

David Seaton's News Links
Before the Second World War, my father worked in a large mail-order firm in Chicago. Among his fellow workers was a very popular Japanese who quit and returned to Japan a couple of years before the war started.

A couple of years after the war ended, the Japanese man reappeared and wanted his job back... They remembered him, they liked him, he was a good worker, he got his job back.

My father and he picked up their friendship where they had left off before the war. Over drinks he told my father about returning to militaristic Japan at the end of the 30s. People in Japan were talking about how they would wipe up the floor with the United States.

"Japan is such a small place," he said, "nobody there had any idea of how big America is, the distances, the scale." There was no way he could communicate his knowledge of America's immense size to his people. Knowledge he had acquired while visiting the company's warehouse all over the USA; exhausting days spent crossing America's vast spaces by car, bus and train.

Only some Japanese navy officers, men who had sailed the seven seas, crossed and recrossed the Pacific, caroused in the world's port cities, had any idea of what he was talking about. They were nervous too, but the army people, with their doll house view of the world, were running the show and they thought that invading and occupying the USA would be a piece of cake.

My father's friend kept his head down and survived the war.

I remembered this story, when I was thinking about Robert Kagan's "league of democracies" and the neocon idea of confronting China. The neocons remind me of the Japanese militarists. They have no idea of what they would have us confront. Here is a sample of what is waiting:

As human rights protesters dogged the Beijing Olympics' torch relay around the world, as supporters of Tibet condemned the violent crackdown in Lhasa, and as Darfur activists demanded change in China's Sudan policy, Chinese young people worked themselves into a different form of righteous anger. In online forums and chat rooms, they blasted Beijing's leaders for not being tougher in Tibet. They agitated for boycotts against Western businesses based in nations that object to Beijing's policies, and they directed venomous fury against anyone critical of China.(...) The explosion of nationalist sentiment, especially among young people, might seem shocking, but it's been simmering for a long time. In fact, Beijing's leadership, for all its problems, may be less hard-line than China's youth, the country's future. If China ever were to become a truly free political system, it might actually become more, not less, aggressive. (...) Even after 9/11, a time when the governments of China and the United States were building a closer relationship, some young Chinese welcomed America's pain. "When the planes crashed into the World Trade Center, I really felt very delighted," one student told Chinese pollsters.(...) They also have begun traveling and working abroad. They can see that Shanghai and Beijing are catching up to Western cities, that Chinese multinationals can compete with the West, and they've lost their awe of Western power. Many middle-aged Chinese intellectuals are astounded by the differences between them and their younger peers. Academics I know, members of the Tiananmen generation, are shocked by some students' disdain for foreigners and, often, disinterest in liberal concepts such as democratization. (...) Beijing has long encouraged nationalism. Over the last decade, the government has introduced new school textbooks that focus on past victimization of China by outside powers. The state media, such as the People's Daily, which hosts one of the most strongly nationalist Web forums, also highlight China's perceived mistreatment at the hands of the United States and other powers. In recent years, too, the Communist Party has opened its membership and perks to young urbanites, cementing the belief that their interests lie with the regime, not with political change -- and that democracy might lead to unrest and instability. (...) In the long run, this explosive nationalism calls into question what kind of democracy China could be. Many Chinese academics, for example, believe that, at least in the early going, a freer China might become a more dangerous China. Able to truly express their opinions, young Chinese would be able to put intense pressure on a freer government to adopt a hard line against the West -- even, perhaps, to invade Taiwan. Joshua Kurlantzick - Los Angeles Times

The neocons idea of confronting China is totally insane.

Kagan is basically saying, "let a hundred Pearl Harbors bloom".

China is a country of one billion people, they have money, they have knowhow, they work hard, they are proud.

They have the world's longest memory.

Size matters.

China is a rule maker, not a rule taker.

China must be accommodated not confronted.

Is this appeasement?

How do you confront an 800lb gorilla?

For starters you call him "Sir". DS

Robert Kagan & William Kristol : Bush's Iraq Legacy - Weekly Standard

David Seaton's News Links

If you were looking for a new definition of the word "chutzpah", this article in the neocon bible by two of the foremost intellectual authors of the tragic fiasco in Iraq would give dozens of fine, ripe examples. DS

Abstract: President Bush has a little over two years left in office. The central question facing him is this: What kind of Iraq will he bequeath to his successor? Will it be an Iraq in a state of collapse, a horrible and metastasizing mess dumped on the doorstep of the next president? Or an Iraq on a path toward stability and success--with increasing security for Iraqi citizens, an increasingly viable political system, and a developing economy? The answer will determine how this president should be remembered by future generations.(...) The current trajectory is downward toward failure. Indeed, this has been the trajectory for over three years, ever since Pentagon officials, civilian and military, decided to put far too few troops in Iraq:(...) At every stage in the ensuing downward spiral, senior Pentagon officials, with the approval not just of the secretary of defense but of two national security advisers and the president himself, have refused to increase American forces in Iraq to the levels necessary for success. On the contrary, they have always had one foot out the door. Pentagon military and civilian officials have been trying to exit Iraq ever since the military entered it.(...) Many are looking to the Iraq Study Group, the commission headed by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, to provide a face-saving, bipartisan way for the United States to withdraw from Iraq as quickly as possible, with a clear conscience(...) The great irony, of course, is that while the Baker commission's anticipated report has been hailed as offering a long-overdue change of course, it seems unlikely to do so. The commission's supporters trumpet the idea that there can be no military solution in Iraq, only a political solution, as if Pentagon officials have not been making the same point for three years.(...) Instead of looking for a graceful and face-saving way to lose in Iraq, the president could finally demand of his civilian and military advisers a strategy to succeed. Such a strategy would do what previous strategies have not done: provide the number of American forces necessary to achieve even minimal political objectives in Iraq. Such an effort would begin by increasing American force levels in Iraq by at least 50,000.(...) The president has two years to turn things around and leave a viable Iraq to the next president. It should be obvious that "staying the course" is a recipe for failure. So are politically driven exit strategies. The president is left with the choice: quit, or do what is necessary to succeed. We trust the president understands that the task before him in Iraq is to find a strategy for success. READ ALL